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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

25 November 1980
NFAC 7712-80

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : [REDACTED] 25X1
Assistant National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe

SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe

SPAIN

1. The position of the Suarez government has become significantly more precarious in recent weeks, and unhappiness in the military has deepened. We note especially that

-- the concern of military leaders has grown not as a result of any specific incident but in a cumulative process;

-- contrary to the military's devotion to Spain's national unity, the regional parties seem to be gaining ground at the expense of the national political organizations;

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-- Suarez' weakness could point toward including the Socialists in a coalition government, but the military would not be happy about this;

-- there is a widespread sense of unease in Spain, a perception that Suarez is floundering and that the government cannot deal with terrorism, or the regional pressures for autonomy, or the severe economic difficulties Spain faces;

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-- within the military there might be very little opposition to a move by a small number of fellow officers against the government taken in the name of restoring Spanish unity and security.

2. If Suarez grows even weaker and political tensions heighten in Spain, the temptation to make some such move will increase.

PORTUGAL

3. Odds are still that President Eanes will win the presidential election on 5 December, although the gap between his supporters and those of the conservative challenger Soares Carneiro seems to be narrowing. The greater uncertainty is how Eanes would then work with the AD government, and especially how he would react to an agreement between the Socialists and the AD on constitutional revisions that would limit presidential powers. Portugal could face some rough sailing in coming months on those questions.

TURKEY

4. Since their takeover of Turkey in September, the generals have markedly improved internal security, driving most of the terrorists underground. They have also carried forward the IMF-approved economic program, and so far there has been no break in the flow of aid promised to Turkey. Fuel shortfalls this winter now look likely to be less severe than last year's (though the Iran-Iraq war still creates supply uncertainties), and the potential for civil disorder arising from economic duress is not high.

5. But a return to civilian rule may now be three to five years away rather than one or two: the generals want to be sure the way is well prepared by a reorganization of both the state bureaucracy and the political party structure. Yet they are uncertain how to remove Demirel and Ecevit from the political scene, and even more so how to rebuild Turkey politically if the current generation of leaders and some of the major political forces in Turkey are suppressed.

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TNF

7. Significant hurdles still lie ahead for LRTNF deployment in Europe. Bonn and Brussels -- despite forward moves on site selection or surveys -- will insist that SALT and TNF arms control negotiations move forward and, if significant progress is lacking, they will have to be convinced that the fault lies on the Soviet side. The Italian Communists are also likely to call for major arms control progress in the TNF context; the UK Labor Party, if it should return to power before actual deployment is scheduled, would be a problem; the Dutch now look most unlikely to deploy in any case. Especially difficult would

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be a reopening of the December 1979 decision as a result of European-wide public insistence on arms control progress -- reflective at least in part of growing anti-nuclear weapon sentiment.

CSCE/CDE

8. After a difficult beginning, the CSCE Review Conference in Madrid looks likely to move forward with implementation review until the last week before the Christmas recess, when new proposals will be advanced -- almost surely including the Soviet and French ideas for a post-Madrid arms control forum. Soviet opposition to expanding the geographical area such arms control talks would cover, and Western insistence so far on the militarily significant measures such talks should discuss, make agreement on a mandate for them improbable. But both the Soviets and the West Europeans (as well as the neutrals) have a strong political interest in a post-Madrid conference, and this could lead to a softening of their positions on the mandate question as the CSCE review progresses.

EUROPE/MIDDLE EAST

9. At the European Council on 1 and 2 December, EC leaders are likely to issue a public statement going further than their Venice declaration did in supporting a Palestinian role in the Middle East peace process and condemning Israel's behavior in the occupied territories and Jerusalem. But the Europeans will be constrained both by the recent anti-Jewish violence in France and by concern that they would create deeper strains in their relationship with the incoming US administration. The Iraq-Iran war will also heighten US-European differences the longer it drags on: some of the Europeans are tempted to side effectively with Iraq, whose long-term role in the region (and whose ties to other major oil producers) they see as critical; but they also fear that resolution of the hostage issue could put the US on the opposite side, and that an eventual US-Soviet competition for influence in Iran might work against stability and the Europeans' own wider interests in the region.

EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO US ELECTIONS

10. Many West Europeans view the incoming US administration with some ambivalence. They expect stronger and more consistent US leadership in the world and within the West, but they also fear that -- whether the US takes a hostile and even provocative approach to the Soviet Union or whether it quickly moves to engage the Soviets in a range of negotiations -- the Europeans' own freedom of movement will be reduced. Concern about the future of arms control under a new US administration is also strong in many West European countries, as is apprehension that the US will press the Europeans to do more on defense measures. It will take some months for the Europeans to find their ground in relations with Washington; the tone set by those relations early on, will have an important impact on how ties later evolve.

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